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Abstract 
Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANET) has emerged as a recognized 
advancement in wireless technologies. Each node in the network may 
be either a vehicle or Road Side Unit (RSU) which has to be equipped 
with the necessary communication facility. Every vehicle in VANET 
must  be  authenticated  to  establish  a  reliable  and  secure  network 
communication.  The  AODV  routing  protocol  which  is  normally 
applied in a VANET scenario does not detect malicious vehicles, if it 
exist.  In this paper, a security mechanism has been incorporated in 
the AODV protocol to strengthen it as Robust AODV (RAODV) to 
detect  a  malicious  vehicle.  Sample  architecture  with  centralized 
control unit, RSUs and some vehicles is illustrated to demonstrate the 
added security feature.  AODV routing protocol has been applied in a 
simulated  environment  using  NS-2  package.  Performance  metrics 
such as Packet Delivery Ratio, End to End delay, Routing Overhead 
and  Number  of  dropped  packets,  for  various  vehicle  speed  were 
analyzed with the RAODV protocol.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Vehicular  Ad  hoc  Networks  (VANET)  has  emerged  as  a 
recognized  advancement  in  wireless  technologies.  VANET 
integrates  Ad  hoc  networks,  Sensor  networks,  Wireless  LAN 
and Cellular networks.  
To improve the  safety and efficiency of the  transportation 
system and to enable new mobile applications and services for 
travelling,  Intelligent  Transportation  Systems  (ITS)  have  been 
developed. The field of Inter Vehicle communication, including 
vehicle to vehicle and Vehicle to Road Side has been recognized 
as an important component of ITS[1,2]. 
In  VANET,  vehicles  act  as  nodes  which  can  exchange 
information  among  each  other  without  any  infrastructure 
network establishment.  In order to participate in such a network, 
a  vehicle  has  to  be  equipped  with  the  necessary  radio 
communication  hardware.  Since  each  network  node  acts  as 
wireless  station  and  mobile  router  at  the  same  time,  distant 
vehicles can communicate with each other by using intermediate 
vehicles for packet forwarding [3].   
VANET  is  also  a  type  of  MANET  however  the  mobility 
pattern of VANET nodes is predefined as they move on specific 
paths and not in random direction. As the mobility pattern of 
VANET nodes is predictable, the limitation on limited storage 
capacity and high processing power does not exist [4].  
Various  Ad  hoc  routing  protocols  have  been  proposed  by 
many  researchers  which  suits  VANET  scenario.  The  Ad  hoc 
protocols  can  be  categorized  as  proactive  protocols,  reactive 
protocols  and  hybrid  protocols.  These  protocols  help  in 
exchanging the data between source and destination through the 
intermediate  nodes  to  forward  the  packets.  Proactive  or  table 
driven protocols maintains a fresh lists of destinations and their 
routes by distributing the routing table information. A Reactive 
or on-demand protocol finds a route on demand by broadcasting 
the Route Request packets. A Hybrid routing protocol combines 
the features of both proactive and reactive protocols.  
Large number of researchers has contributed their findings 
towards  securing  VANET  [5]-[11].  However,  detecting 
malicious  behavior  of  a  particular  vehicle  is  yet  to  be 
incorporated. In this paper, Reactive AODV routing protocol has 
been  enhanced  with  security  feature,  to  detect  the  malicious 
behavior of the vehicle. 
This paper is organized as follows; Section 2 describes the 
characteristics  of  VANET.  Section  3  describes  the  VANET’s   
architecture scenario which has been used for demonstrating the 
incorporated security feature in the AODV protocol. In Section 4 
the performance evaluation has been carried out by analyzing 
RAODV protocol. Section 5 presents the conclusion and future 
scope. 
2. CHARACTERISTICS OF VANET   
Vehicular networks have specific characteristics which have 
to  be  taken  into  account  while  building  the  architecture.  As 
stated  in  [13]  VANETs  comprise  of  radio-enabled  vehicles 
which act as mobile nodes as well as routers for other nodes. In 
addition to the similarities to Ad hoc networks, such as short 
radio  transmission  range,  self-organization,  self  management, 
and low bandwidth, VANETs can be distinguished from other 
kinds of Ad hoc networks as follows, 
Highly  Dynamic  Topology:  Due  to  the  rapid  changes  in  the 
speed of vehicles, the topology of VANET often changes.  
Frequently Disconnected Network: Due to the above reason, 
the  connectivity  of  the  VANETs  is  subjected  to  change 
frequently.  Especially  when  the  vehicle  density  is  low,  it  has 
higher probability that the network will be disconnected with a 
very short duration of communication. 
Sufficient  Energy  and  Storage:  A  common  characteristic  of 
nodes  in  VANETs  is  that  nodes  have  ample  energy  and 
computing power (both storage and processing), since nodes are 
vehicles instead of small handheld devices. 
Mobility Modeling and Prediction: Due to high movement of 
vehicles and dynamic topology, mobility model and prediction 
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Interaction  with  On-Board  Sensors:  The  sensors  in  each 
vehicle can be used to get the vehicle position, their speed and 
direction to establish Ad hoc communication. 
No  Confidentiality  for  Safety  Information:  For  safety 
applications,  the  information  contained  in  a  message  is  of 
interest for all road users, and hence message is not confident 
[14]. 
Central  Authority:  For  the  sake  of  security,  each  and  every 
vehicle  in  the  network  has  to  be  registered  with  a  common 
Centralized  Authority  and  should  be  assigned  an  unique 
identifier.  
Power  Consumption:  In  traditional  wireless  networks,  nodes 
are power limited and their life depends on their batteries.  But 
Vehicles can provide continuous power to their computing and 
communication devices [15]. 
3. ARCHITECTURE  FOR  VANET  WITH 
CENTRALIZED AUTHORITY 
In designing the  system  model, the  following assumptions 
are brought into consideration. VANET consists of Vehicles and 
Road Side Unit (RSU) as their nodes. Each and every node has 
to be registered with the Centralized Authority. Each node will 
be assigned a unique identification by submitting their original 
identity  like  vehicle  number.  RSU  will  be  maintained  by  the 
Government so that RSU will not malfunction at any cost. 
 
Fig.1. Architecture with Centralized Authority 
Sample  architecture  is  shown  in  Fig.1.  In  this  model,  a 
Centralized  Authority  with  two  RSU,  and  four  vehicles,  of 
which  two  travels  in  one  direction  and  the  other  two  in  the 
opposite direction with uniform speed has been considered. All 
the nodes (RSU and vehicles) are registered initially with the 
base  station  which  acts  as  a  Centralized  Authority.  Each  and 
every  vehicle  in  the  network  will  be  placed  with  a  special 
electronic device which provides Ad hoc network connectivity 
for them. Each vehicle equipped with the device will be a node 
in  the  network  and  can  receive  and  relay  other’s  messages 
through  the  wireless  network.  Vehicles  in  the  network  can 
communicate through intermediate vehicles and /or nearby fixed 
road side unit. 
The message is transferred from one vehicle to other through 
RSU.  The  vehicle  which  enters  first  in  each  direction  will 
receive the message from the RSU and then it passes it to the 
other vehicles in the same direction. RSU in the network stores 
the information like vehicle ID, speed, and type etc., of all the 
vehicles crossing its area with the help of onsite camera. 
In  this  paper,  we  present  RAODV  protocol  based  on  the 
AODV, which detects the malicious vehicle even after proper 
registration. Once a  malicious vehicle has been detected by a 
central authority (CA), a warning message will be broadcasted to 
the nearby RSUs and vehicles in the vicinity area. As an initial 
measure, the packets will not be sent to the malicious vehicles. 
During the simulation period, if a vehicle behave  maliciously 
then  immediate  action  of  isolating  it  from  other  vehicles  is 
handled  by  RAODV  protocol  and  it  is  evaluated  using  the 
metrics described below.  
3.1  PERFORMANCE METRICS 
Packet Delivery Ratio: Packet delivery ratio describes the loss 
rate of the packets. It also affects the maximum throughput. It 
can  be  defined  as  the  ratio  between  the  total  numbers  of  the 
Constant Bit Ratio (CBR) packets delivered to the destination to 
the total numbers of packets sent by the source. 
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Dropped Packets: In a computer network, packet loss occurs 
when one or more packets travelling across a computer network 
fail  to  reach  their  destination.  The  total  number  of  packets 
dropped during the transmission is calculated as follows, 
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where, 
DPackets –Dropped Packets 
SCBR-Sent Constant Bit Ratio 
RCBR-Received Constant Bit Ratio 
Average End to End Delay: It includes all delays caused by 
buffering  during  route  discovery,  queuing  at  the  interface, 
retransmission  at  the  Medium  Access  Control  (MAC), 
propagation  and  transfer  times.  In  simpler  terms  the  average 
End-to-end delay is the time it takes for a packet to travel across 
the network from source to destination.  
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Routing  Overhead:  The  ratio  of  total  numbers  of  routing 
packets generated to the total number of data packets received 
during the simulation time. 
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4. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
4.1  SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT 
NS-2  (Network  Simulator-2)  [16]  has  been  used  for 
performance evaluation. Vehicle behavior  has been  studied in 
the  area  of  1000m  x  1000m.  Each  and  every  vehicle  which 
participates in the  network  has to be registered  with the  base 
station which acts as a Centralized Authority. 
The  experiment  uses  fixed  number  of  vehicles  with  CBR 
(Constant Bit Rate) as a traffic generator and uses a maximum of 
four CBR traffic, data transfer rate as 0.064Mbps at the vehicle 
speed  50,  75,  90,  100,  110  and  120  m/sec.  The  simulation 
parameters are summarized in Table.1. 
Table.1. Simulation Parameters 
Parameter  Value 
Simulator  NS-2 
Simulation Time  300sec 
Centralized Authority  
(Base Station)  1 
No. of Vehicles  4 
No. of RSU  2 
No. of CBR traffic  4 
Vehicle Speed 
(m/sec)  50,75,90,100,110,120 
Packet Size  512 KB 
Transmission rate  0.064Mbps 
Protocol  AODV 
Area  1000m x 1000m 
Antenna  Omni directional 
In our system, it was assumed that initially all the vehicles 
including  RSU  are  reliable.  Since  RSUs  are  deployed  and 
maintained  by  trusted  parties  it  is  assumed  that  there  is  no 
possibility for the RSU to be compromised even at a later stage. 
It is assumed that there is a possibility for a vehicle to misbehave 
even after due registration. The initial screen shot of the vehicle 
is shown in Fig.2. 
 
Fig.2. Initial Screen shot after node deployment 
4.2  SIMULATION RESULTS 
Packet Delivery Ratio, Average End_to_End Delay, Dropped 
Packets  and  Routing  Overhead  are  the  performance  metrics 
considered.  The  performance  evaluation  was  carried  out 
considering  these  metrics  using  RAODV  protocol  with  and 
without malicious node.  
Packet  Delivery  Ratio:  Fig.3  shows  the  performance  of  the 
RAODV protocol on the basis of PDR for various speeds of the 
vehicles. Initially the performance was analyzed by considering 
all the vehicles as trusted, which gave a PDR of 99% in average 
irrespective of the speed of the vehicles in free attack. When 
vehicle 4 started misbehaving, it must be identified as malicious 
either  by  the  CA  or  RSU  and  packets  should  not  be  send  it. 
When the total number of packets sent to the vehicle decreases 
obviously the PDR should also decrease. The average PDR of 
27% was obtained with a malicious node being detected. The 
decrease in PDR clearly indicates that RAODV has successfully 
detected the malicious node.   
 
 
Fig.3. Vehicle Speed Vs PDR 
Number of Dropped packets: In this simulated environment 
the  value  of  the  sent  CBR  was  around  16252  uniformly  for 
various vehicle speeds with few packets being dropped here and 
there when all the vehicles were reliable. When vehicle 4 started 
misbehaving, it will not receive packets and hence the received 
CBR was around 4528, so the number of dropped packets was 
around 11000 irrespective of vehicle speed when the malicious 
node was detected by the RAODV. Fig.4 shows the number of 
dropped packets after detecting a malicious vehicle. 
Average  end  to  end  delay:  Fig.5  shows  average  end  to  end 
delay  for  various  vehicle  speeds  with  and  without  malicious 
vehicle. Normally, with the volume of packets in the observed 
results, it is clear that when more number of packets were sent 
the delay will be more and the lesser the packets, the lesser the 
delay. The chart clearly indicates that with a malicious vehicle 
being  detected  the  number  of  packets  being  sent  is  less  and 
hence the delay.   
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Fig.4. Vehicle Speed Vs No. of dropped packets 
 
Fig.5. Vehicle Speed Vs End to End delay 
 
Fig.6. Vehicle Speed Vs Routing Overhead 
Routing Overhead: Fig.6 shows the performance of RAODV 
protocol on the basis of routing overhead by varying the vehicle 
speed. In the simulated environment the generated packets was 
around 16252. With one  malicious  vehicle being detected the 
number of dropped packets and control packets increases which 
in turn increases the routing overhead value. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have presented the important and unique 
characteristics of VANET. Architecture has been designed with 
a  Centralized  Authority  to  which  every  vehicle  and  RSU 
registers.  AODV  protocol  has  been  strengthened  as  RAODV 
protocol with an added security feature of detecting malicious 
vehicle. The proposed architecture has been evaluated for the 
performance metrics of Packet Delivery Ratio, Average End to 
End Delay, Routing Overhead and Number of dropped packets. 
The obtained results clearly indicated that the RAODV protocol 
identifies a misbehaving vehicle even after proper registration.  
In this paper, an attempt has been made to enhance AODV by 
incorporating security in to it. In similar line, research can be 
focused to enhance the protocol for incorporating other security 
related issues. Other ad hoc protocol can also be enhanced as a 
feature research scope. 
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